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Introduction
The distribution of medical students' career choice among specialties is the object of intense debate. It is generally acknowledged, for example, that there is a chronic de cit of service in general medicine and in some specialties such as psychiatry (Brotherton et al. 2005 ).
1 If wages can freely adjust, as they often do in many countries, how can such imbalances persist? Another puzzle that has recently received much attention in the United States is the dramatic growth in specializations. The number of medical sub-specialties has grown from about 30 in the early 70's to more than 100 in the late 90's (Donini- Lenho , 2000) . This paper develops a theoretical framework that explains how medical students sort across medical occupations, identi es a mechanism that can explain (a) the possibility of distortions in the supply of health care services across medical occupations and (b) changes in the extent of specialization, and establishes connections between these two outcomes.
Our approach assumes that medical occupations compete for talent but di er in their exposure to moral hazard risk. Thus, it is harder to evaluate e ort in medical occupations where decision-making is less grounded in scienti c fact and clinical evidence and where clinical outcomes are uncertain, di cult to compare, and rarely repeated. We develop this point in greater detail in the next section. Each occupation o ers a pay-for-performance contract that trades-o compensation risk and e ort incentive, as in the standard moral hazard model. When medical students select an occupation, they take into account how their performance will be evaluated and rewarded in their future career, and the associated risk they will face.
We investigate how di erences in moral hazard risk across occupations in uence the matching of occupations and talents, equilibrium contracts, and productivity. To our knowledge, this is the rst work that considers the possibility that di erential exposure to asymmetric information (moral hazard) across careers can in uence career choices and the incentive to specialize. For the sake of concreteness and relevance, we study the market for graduate medical education, but one should keep in mind that many of our insights apply more broadly to other specialized labor markets.
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Speci cally, the model combines moral hazard (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) , matching of physicians and medical occupations (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) , and pre-matching investments (Peters and Siow, 2002) . We show that in equilibrium assortative matching takes place. More able physicians join medical occupations with low moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Even when all medical occupations are identical ex-ante in terms of marginal productivity of e ort, productivity is higher in less risky occupations. Two forces drive this result. First, more able physicians end up in occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk. Second, these occupations use more powerful incentives and this further magni es di erences in productivity. This second e ect is best illustrated in the benchmark case where physicians are almost identical so that the rst e ect has a negligible impact on productivity.
The model identi es two channels through which an ine cient allocation of physicians can develop. To begin with, those occupations where risk is too high fail to emerge in equilibrium because they cannot produce enough surplus to cover outside options. Secondly, those physicians who accept a position in a high-risk occupation face less powerful incentives and supply less e ort. These two channels imply that ine ciencies increase with occupational risk. In addition, this ine ciency di erential across occupations increases as the distributions of physician talent and occupational risk are more dispersed.
Since wages can perfectly adjust in the model, there is no shortage in the sense that some patients cannot nd a physician. The distribution of consumption across occupations, however, is distorted relative to the rst best one. There is under-consumption of high risk services. The di erential between marginal productivity and marginal cost of e ort increases with occupational risk.
In practice, many factors in uence the sorting of physicians across medical occupa-2 Examples include markets for other professionals (e.g. business and law education also o er specializations), and internal labor markets in large organizations (e.g. the army o ers specializations such as combat, engineering, and intelligence and banks o er careers in sales, trading, and corporate nance). These specialized labor markets share in common the features that workers make speci c human capital investments and commit to a career, while employers compete for workers with career promises.
2 tions. For example, lifestyle and work schedule have been shown to in uence career choice (Landon et al. 2003a ). Some of these factors also explain why the relative demand for some occupations can change over time. As long as wages can adjust, however, the factors that have been identi ed in the literature do not give rise to ine ciencies and should not raise concerns among policy-makers. Alternatively, some specialties may arti cially restrict entry (Le er, 1978) , but this cannot explain the excess residency positions in some specialties. Finally, sub-optimal matching institutions may lead to ine ciencies, but it is not clear why systematic di erentials across specialties should develop (Roth, 2008) . Our contribution is to show that asymmetric information can generate systematic distortions in the distribution of health care supply across specialties.
After presenting the main results, we discuss several implications. The analysis suggests an explanation for the reduced enrollment in generalist career relative to specialist ones. Assume that moral hazard risk has decreased in specialty careers relative to generalist ones. This is consistent with evidence presented in DeWitt et al (1998) , and could be due, for example, to a di erential increase in the role of scienti c measurement in many specialties. The implication is that specialty careers would become more attractive.
In addition, we argue that the model can help explain the growth in specialization over the past decades. The analysis shows that low-risk sub-specialities have an incentive to branch out from their main eld. By doing so, they can attract better physicians and increase productivity. The model also sheds some light on the impact of malpractice reform on the distribution of physicians across specialties and across states (Kessler et al, 2005) . Finally, an increased emphasis on performance measurement or on nancial incentives, due to pressure from consumer advocate groups, health insurers or policymakers as has happened in recent years, is likely to exacerbate the relative shortage of talent across medical occupations. Our analysis suggests that such reform should be implemented across-the-board to internalize externalities across specialties, instead of specialty-by-specialty, as currently done.
The incentive literature has studied performance measurement at the rm level (see Prendergast 1999 for a review) and many studies have investigated empirically the canonical proposition that incentive power should decrease with performance risk (Prendergast, 3 2002 ). Little attention has been dedicated to the study of broader implications of moral hazard at a more macro level, across occupations or within a specialized labor market, as we do in this paper. In particular, there is to our knowledge no work investigating the possibility that moral hazard may lead to a failure to organize an economic activity.
3
Our central assumption that heterogeneity in the exposure to moral hazard risk may inuence matching, plays an important role in the empirical literature studying the relation between incentives and performance risk (Chiappori and Salanie, 2003) . While the empirical literature has focused on single occupations and considered only matching on risk aversion on the worker side (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002), we consider di erentiated occupations and study matching over worker talent.
Our model borrows two important ideas from the literature on organizational design. Milgrom (1991, 1994) have shown the importance of interactions between di erent inputs of production and incentive instruments within a rm. Likewise, our model makes extensive use of complementarity, not only within production units as in the past literature, but also across units through assortative matching as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) . Technically, the model is similar to Serfes (2005, forthcoming) who embeds Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) within a matching setup, but he does so to capture the possibility of endogenous matching on risk aversion as suggested by the evidence from Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) . In contrast with our model which assumes heterogeneity in talent, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not su cient in general to guarantee assortative matching. There is much evidence supporting our assumption that talent determines sorting (e.g. Kiker and Zeh (1998) show that performance in medical school in uences the choice of specialty).
The next section provides some background discussion on the market for physicians.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the main results on sorting, productivity, and pay incentives. Section 5 discusses some implications and Section 6 concludes.
Medical Occupations, Career Choice, and Moral Hazard
About one-third of physicians are primary care doctors. There are specialties within primary care such as pediatrics. When patients' speci c health needs require further treatment, primary care physicians send them to see a specialist. Specialist physicians di er from primary care ones in that they focus on treating a particular system or part of the body, such as neurologists who study the brain. In the United States, there are about 30 medical specialties and 100 subspecialities. Di erent organizations are involved in controlling quality through accreditation of programs, certi cation and disciplining of physicians (specialty boards), and licensure (government).
Career Choice
The issue of matching physicians' choice of medical career with medical need is often debated and even more so when shortages become salient (Thornton and Esposto, 2002) .
Enrolment across careers displays cycles in addition to long term trends (Dorsey et al. 2003 ). For example, there has been a steady decline in the ratio of generalists to specialists over the past decade. Both the government and medical societies intervene, through funding priorities, subsidized loan programs, educational reforms, and regulated work schedules to name just a few examples, to correct trends that could have a negative impact on the ability to provide, in the long-term, a balanced specialty mix of medical care. For example, in 1993 and 1994, the Physician Payment Review Commission advised
Congress to implement a system of quantitative restrictions on positions.
There is a large literature studying the choice of medical specialty both in medicine (e.g. Weeks and Wallace, 2002) and economics (Nicholson, 2002 News and World Report rankings), peer assessments of physicians (the advice of a family doctor), reputation, word-of-mouth, disciplining boards, and so on. These perceptions drive up or down the demand for particular physicians.
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The model also assumes that employers can reduce moral hazard by introducing performance incentives but they have to strike a balance between incentives and risk exposure. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with our main assumption that there exist systematic di erences across medical occupations in the quality of information available to assess physician performance, and therefore di erences in occupational exposure to moral hazard. To reduce the number of actors in the analysis, the model assumes that a single employer hires a single physician in each medical occupation. Adding competition between employers and physicians within a medical occupation, as is the case, for example, when di erent radiology departments compete for radiologists, would not change the analysis.
In addition, we assume that di erent medical occupations can o er di erent incentive 6 To illustrate, consider the problem of evaluating a neurosurgeon's removal of a nerve root tumor, a tumor that develops from the cells of the nerve or of its lining near the point it exits the spinal canal. The outcome|the degree to which pain and numbness are reduced and whether permanent paralysis results|depends not only on the skill, dexterity, and care of the surgeon, but also on chance. It depends on chance because the surgeon has little in uence over the size, location, and degree of separation between the tumor and nerve tissue but these things in uence the surgical outcome. In specialized practices where this procedure is performed frequently, the noise averages out, and the quality of e ort is more easily discerned. In more general practices (say in less urban areas) where the surgeon is treating a variety of conditions her performance will be noisier.
7 \Few medical specialties have an evidence base that is robust and comprehensive enough to support physician clinical performance assessment. Some specialties such as cardiology and endocrinology have some evidence-based process measure that have been de nitely linked to improved patient outcomes. Other specialties such as cardiac surgery, have outcomes that have been studied, such as mortality in coronary artery bypass grafting. Outcome measures for other specialties, however, occur too infrequently or tool long after care to make their collection feasible."
8 Hearing on Measuring Physician Quality and E ciency of Care for Medicare Bene ciaries. http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=390 9 For example, patient management plays an important role in medical care but the associated skills are very di cult to measure. One aspect considered in the medical literature corresponds to empathy. Many experts believe that empathy, de ned as understanding the \patient's inner experiences and perspective and communicating this understanding", in uences clinical outcomes (Hojat et al. 2002) . The importance of empathy, however, varies across specialties, being more important in the \people-oriented" specialties (such as psychiatry, pediatrics or family practice) as compared to the technically-oriented disciplines (such as surgery or anesthesiology).
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contracts. This captures the fact that the hospital or health organization where physicians work, can treat di erently physicians in di erent occupations.
Model
The objective of the model is to identify a mechanism that can generate di erential ine ciencies across medical occupations and also to reveal the factors that cause this di erential. To achieve this goal, we selectively include in the model the features that can generate such an e ect or magnify it. Because these features are not necessarily present simultaneously, the distortions observed in practice may not be as dramatic as those that the model can explain.
There are three building blocks to the model: pre-matching investments, matching, and moral hazard. The moral hazard part uses functional forms that are standard in the incentive literature and justi ed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . Following the assortative matching literature, we model matching using unidimensional preference ordering.
A more realistic model would acknowledge the fact that matching takes place along other dimensions but this would not change the nature of the results.
The model has physicians and employers (hospitals, health maintenance organizations, partnerships). To simplify the exposition in the core of the analysis, we assume without loss of generality, that each employer represents a medical occupation, and as such, is endowed with a distinct technology to control moral hazard risk. (When we discuss the issue of specialization we will consider a sightly di erent interpretation of the model.)
There are three periods (see Figure 1) . In period one, physicians invest in human capital and employers invest to reduce exposure to moral hazard risk. At the end of period one, the distribution of human capital amongst physicians and moral hazard risk amongst occupations are observed. In the second period, physicians and employers match and agree on a contract. In the third period, physicians exert e ort, nature draws performance, and contracts are executed.
There is a continuum of physicians indexed by 2 R = [ 0 ; 1 ]. Physician type is distributed with density f > 0 and continuous distribution F . Investment in human capital lowers the cost of e ort. All results follow if we assume instead that it increases productivity of e ort and we will further discuss the issue after presenting the results. A physician with cost of e ort c gets disutility C(ejc) 0 for exerting e ort e 0 where C e > 0, C ee > 0, C c > 0, and C ce > 0. Physician of type achieves cost index c 0 if
she invests H(cj ) 0 where H c < 0, H cc > 0, H < 0, H c > 0, and H = 0 for c large enough. The utility of a physician of type who selects cost of e ort c, exerts e orts e, and is paid wage w is
where superscripts denote the period and agent considered, and r is the coe cient of absolute risk aversion. There is a continuum of employers (or medical occupations), indexed by , which are taken as given. is distributed according to density g > 0 and continuous distribution G with support = [ 0 ; 1 ]. Work e ort is subject to moral hazard. Employers, however, can reduce exposure to moral hazard. Employer can achieve moral hazard risk s 0 at cost K(sj ) 0 where
K s > 0, and K = 0 for s large enough. 10 Each employer receives an imperfect measure of e ort according to m(e; s) = e + " s where " s is an error term that is distributed normally with mean zero and variance s 2 .
The measurement errors are independently drawn across employers.
In period two, physicians and employers decide whether to match, and conditional on matching, agree on a contract. Following the literature, we restrict to linear compensation
The physician then chooses e ort level e and nature draws performance outcome m.
Finally, the employer rewards the physician according to the agreed rule w(m). We rst assume that all employers equally value (e) > 0 e ort level e such that 0 > 0 and 00 < 0. We later discuss the case of heterogeneous productivity across occupations.
Employers are risk neutral and maximize (e) Ew(m) K(sj ), or
We focus on stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 ). We denote 2;S (c) the employer matched with physician c if physician c is matched and 2;S (c) = ; otherwise. For ease of exposition, we similarly de ne 2;P (s) and we have The functions u 2;P () and u 2;S () correspond to the market return of investments. As in Peters and Siow (2002) , physicians and employers choose optimal investments given their expectations about the market returns. The main di erence is that utility is transferable in our model so the functions u 2;P () and u 2;S () do not depend only on equilibrium matching, as would be the case under non-transferable utilities, but also depend on the equilibrium sharing rule.
Our objective is to derive equilibrium cross variations in (c( ); s( ); 2;S (c); e(c); B(c)).
The main innovations of the model is to capture the fact that exposure to moral hazard varies across employers and to allow for matching. For the sake of generality, we have introduced the possibility of pre-matching investments by employers, and this addresses the concern that exposure to moral hazard is to some extent endogenous. We also consider pre-matching investment by physicians to capture the e ort supplied during medical school training, but this feature of the model is not essential.
In addition to boundary conditions, two technical conditions are su cient to demonstrate equilibrium uniqueness.
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Assumption 1:
This assumption holds, for example, for quadratic cost C(ejc) = 
Assumptions A2 guaranty that the pre-matching investments are monotone in type.
Analysis
We derive the main qualitative results in the context of the general model. To discuss additional implications, we consider a restricted version of the model where it is possible to derive closed form solutions. We assume no pre-matching investments = c and = s 12 C e (0jc) = 0, C e (1jc) = 1, K s (0; ) = 1, K s (1; ) = 0, H c (0; ) = 1, H c (1; ) = 0, and C c (0jc) bounded.
13 This is the sum of the specialty pro t and physician certainty equivalent. The meaning of this expression will become clear after Lemma 1.
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and functional forms C(ejc) = ce 2 2 and (e) = e. The reader who perfers to start with an example should read section 4.3 rst. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, consider the case where e ort is perfectly observable (no moral hazard).
Employers do not invest to reduce s (K = 0) and sorting is arbitrary. Since employers are identical, they receive the same payo , which is determined such that both sides of the market are willing to participate, and physicians receive the residual surplus. Physician of type chooses c( ) and e( ) such that, H c (cj ) + C c (ejc) = 0 and C e (ejc) = e (e) independently of the employer she is matched with.
In the application with no pre-matching investments (H = 0) and quadratic cost of e ort, the e ort supplied by physician c is e(c) = c :
The period two surplus under the symmetric information W 2;F B (c; s) = M ax e f (e) C(ejc)g by pair (c; s) measured in monetary terms is,
Employers do not to invest to reduce moral hazard risk, s. Surplus increases in talent and is independent of employer risk. Medical occupations are completely undi erentiated.
Under symmetric information, the model does not say anything about specialization. We will return to the issue when we discuss the incentives to specialize under asymmetric information.
Asymmetric Information
We analyze the problem backward. Consider a physician of type c who has matched in period two with employer s and agreed to contract (b 0 ; b 1 ). In period three, the physician sets e to maximize b 1 e C(ejc). The period three e ort e(c; b 1 ) solves
13
We can now characterize the incentive component of the period two contract. This corresponds to the maximum payo (in certainty equivalent units) that the pair can achieve under incentive compatibility.
We now turn to the matching problem. Stability requires W 2;SB (c; s) = u 2;P (c) + (2005)), our model shows that unobserved heterogeneity on worker ability also matters. Since ability is negatively associated with risk and positively with incentives, ignoring such heterogeneity introduces a bias toward over-estimating of the negative relationship between risk and incentives.
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independent of occupational risk. The analysis may change if one assumes that part of the risk can be controlled by the worker. For example, the equilibrium matching may di er if more able workers can control risk more e ciently. The model, therefore, applies primarily to sources of risks that are outside the control of physicians. We can now state our main proposition.
Proposition 1:
There exists a unique equilibrium up to the xed constant b 0 (c( 0 )).
Period two matching is de ned by
contracting is de ned by (2), e orts by (1), and investments by
Equations (3) and (4) In equilibrium, higher ability workers acquire lower costs of e ort, and higher type occupations invest more to lower exposure to moral hazard. Higher ability physicians work in occupations that have more precise measurement, face stronger incentives, and supply more e ort. Productivity increases with type. Because of the complementarity between physicians and occupations, a given increase in physician quality is magni ed so that joint surplus increases by a disproportional factor ( 
E ciency
We now turn to the main implications of the model. Firstly, there is a shortage of e ort in all occupations relative to the rst best level of e ort, because the e ective marginal cost of e ort, C e (1+rs 2 C ee ), includes a risk premium due to moral hazard. Most importantly, this shortage of e ort increases with occupational risk. As a result, the ratio between marginal productivity and marginal cost of e ort, a measure of occupational e ciency, increases with occupational type.
Di erences in moral hazard across occupations generates di erences in producticvity.
Secondly, some occupations may have to shut down in equilibrium. Participation in the above equilibrium is warranted as long as the surplus of the lowest types is su cient to cover their reservation utilities
and this condition holds under the assumption ln U 0;P = V 0;S = 0. To further explore the role of outside options, assume that there exists a 2 [ 0 ; 1 ] such that
All physicians such that < and occupations such that < G 1 (F ( )) = prefer the outside option. Total employment, de ned as the mass of employed physicians, 1 F ( ), increases with an improvement in moral hazard technology. Employers with high moral hazard risk have to shut down in equilibrium despite the fact that the marginal productivity of e ort is the same in these occupations and in those occupations that do not shut down. The viability of a medical occupation depends on its exposure to moral hazard. The main message of the model is to show that occupations subject to high moral hazard risk will face more di culties attracting talented physicians.
Thirdly, the only source of ine ciency is due to moral hazard. There do not exist alternative matches or investments that would make any pair better o . In particular, physicians and occupations do not over-invest to improve their match opportunities. 
Growth in Specialization
Medical practices with low exposure to moral hazard have an incentive to branch out into independent occupation since by doing so they can attract better physicians and increase joint-surplus. The current model, however, does deliver this prediction because the set of occupations is xed by assumption. To make progress, we propose a slightly 
Example and Discussion
Closed form solutions can be obtained in the case without pre-matching investments.
Assortative matching implies F ( 2;P (s)) = G(s). Contract, e ort, and surplus are given by b 1 ( 2;P (s)) = 1 + r 2;P (s)s 2 e( 2;P (s)) = 2;P (s) (1 + r 2;P (s)s 2 ) W 2;SB ( 2;P (s); s) = A su cient condition for compensation risk to decrease with occupational risk is r 2;P (s)s 2 < 1 which is equivalent to b 1 ( 2;P (s)) < 2 . When the incentive schemes are low powered (the physician gets a share lower than fty percent), more talented physicians will earn less variable compensation, despite the fact that they face more powerful incentives. This is because they work in less risky occupations. In general, the covariation between occupational risk and pay variability depends on the strength of these countervailing e ects.
This suggests that one has to be careful measuring risk empirically. Pay variability cannot be used as a proxy for occupational risk.
Implications
As mentioned in the introduction, many considerations in uence the sorting of physicians and medical occupations. The model, however, focuses exclusively on moral hazard risk.
The proper use of the model, therefore, is to consider situations where moral hazard risk varies over time, space, or similar occupations, and to study the impact on sorting, holding other considerations constant. We present three applications along these lines.
In addition, the model can be used to formulate normative assessments of policy. To illustrate, we discuss implications of the recent debate on performance measurement.
Generalist versus Specialist Careers
In recent years, medical students tend to favour specialist occupations over being a generalist. Among the factors that in uence this decision, DeWitt et al. (1998) report that \subjects cited the ability in specialty practice to have problems`well-framed,' tò be the expert,' and to gain mastery over a smaller core of knowledge, as well as the uncertainty inherent in general medicine. Many expressed variations of one physician's opinion that,`It's easier to be a specialist because there's a smaller area of expertise and one can happily and guiltlessly ignore all other problems'." The model can explain the recent imbalance of generalists relative to specialists by a di erential decrease in risk in the latter occupation, and this interpretation is consistent with the above conclusions. In addition, the nding that more able physicians sort in narrower elds is consistent with the literature. For example, Kiker and Zeh (1998) report that`It is generally expected that physicians with greater academic ability opt for the more technical specialties over primary care.'
Growth in Specialization
The model also provides an explanation for the recent growth in the number of medical specialties. The recognition of medical specialties started in the late 1920's in an attempt to standardize curriculum, training, and quali cation. The number of sub-specialties, measured either by the number of sub-specialties with accredited programs or with certi cation of individual physicians, has grown from about 30 in the early 1970's to more than 100 in the late 1990's (Donini-Lenho , 2000). The appropriate mix of generalist and specialist has been an ongoing topic of debate (Barondess, 2000) . Some see specialization as the result of technological and scienti c advances and we do not deny that such trends play a role. 16 We argue that in addition to this fragmentation force, the issue of moral hazard may have also played a role in the growth in specialization. The model shows that sub-specialties that cover domains where performance can be assessed more accurately have an incentive to branch out. For example, the sample size e ect suggests that moral hazard might be reduced in more specialized elds where physicians repeat the same procedures.
The view presented in this work is consistent with the observation that the growth in specialization is largely decentralized and has been supply-driven. For example, Martini (1993) argues that \the system responds more promptly to professionals' interests and institutionals' service needs" than to \the health need of the population". Some have even argued that the proliferation of specialties di uses responsibility for clinical care over time and over multiple health disorders which is fully consistent with the view presented in our analysis. While generalists are exposed to a common risk associated with unknown ailments, specialists are held responsible only for speci c disorders.
A prediction speci c to our analysis is that one would expect to observe more subspecialization when there is more heterogeneity in risk within the set of disorders that belong to a given medical eld. In addition, the branching out should be initiated by low risk sub-specialties. This prediction has obvious implications in the context of the malpractice debate. Given that malpractice premia are specialty dependent, those physicians working in low-risk specialties do not want to pool risk with high-risk specialties.
We argue that this same force o ers a more general explanation for the trend toward specialization. that malpractice risk has a negative impact on physician supply (a nding consistent with our analysis) but the e ect is not signi cant.
Even more convincingly, Kessler et al. (2005) showed that the legal reform had a lower impact among physicians practicing in large organizations. Since the expected cost of malpractice should be independent of the size of the organization, the reform should have an impact on the relative supply of physicians only through a change in relative risk. Because it is more di cult to self-insure risk in small organizations, the reform should di erentially increase the attractiveness of small organizations, and this prediction is consistent with the evidence presented in Kessler et al.
Policy Implications
Consumer advocacy groups, health insurers, and medical societies share interests in the development of methods that permit to identify and reward better physicians. 18 Another approach to increase quality of care is to require medical specialties to administer re-
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The model suggests that policies geared toward the introduction of performance measurement should take into account the sorting implications of unevenly changing moral hazard risk across medical occupations. An increased emphasis on pay-for-performance, through subsidies to invest in s for example, will change the relative importance of performance incentives across medical occupations, and could increase the importance of PAM, with possible distortions in the allocation of talent. Our model establishes a connection between the debate on performance measurement in medicine and the debate on the supply physicians across medical occupations, and suggests that in order to internalize externalities across specialties, reforms that in uence moral hazard risks should be implemented across-the-board instead of specialty-by-specialty.
Conclusions
This paper presents a model of sorting of physicians across medical occupations. Our departing assumption is that it is more di cult to identify physicians' performance in For the sake of completeness, we present all the steps to derive the equilibrium.
Equilibrium De nition
We de ne the continuation payo s (in certainty equivalent units) in period two, conditional on matching and investments as U 2;P (b; c; s) and U 2;S (b; c; s). Using the e ort rule e(b 1 ; c) from equation (1) and specialty s such that 2;P (s) 6 = ; does not want to deviate from B( 2;P (s))and 2;P (s)
B ( The maximum computed under the restriction that the constraint binds is weakly dominated by the maximum without this restriction. The maximization problem on the right hand side has a unique optimum as long as C 2 ee + C e C eee > 0 which holds under A1a. The optimum is achieved at b 1 (c). The above inequality contradicts the assumption that b 1 6 = b 1 (c). QED
Restatement of the Period Two Matching Problem
Denote by W 2 (c; s) the period two certainty equivalent of pair (c; s).
Assumption A1a is su cient to guarantee that there is a unique maximum. We rewrite the stability conditions in period two for any pair (c; s) as u 2;P (c) + u 2;S ( 2;S (c)) = W 2;SB (c; 2;S (c)) for any c such that 2;S (c) 6 = ; u 2;P (c) W 2;SB (c; s) u 2;S (s) for any c; s
The rst conditions say that any matched pair splits their joint surplus. The second condition corresponds to the stability conditions that no physician or specialty would be better o in a di erent match.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof proceeds in three steps. Summing up these two inequalities gives
which contradicts the fact that and s are complement in K.
To conclude, note that a similar proof as the one presented in claim 3 shows that there is also PAM in ( ; s). Lemma 2 then follows by putting together PAM in (c; ), (c; s), and ( ; s). QED Proof of Proposition 1 Lemma 2 says that in there is PAM in (c; s) in any equilibrium. We rst compute the market return functions under period two equilibrium matching, then the equilibrium investments in period one, and nally show that the equilibrium investments in period one are consistent with the market return functions.
Claim 1: Assume there is a continuum of types (c; s) in period two. There exists a unique equilibrium (up to constants u 2;P (c 1 ) and u 2;S (s 1 )) and it satis es PAM. The market return functions u 2;P (:) and u 2;S (:) are given by Claim 2: Equilibrium investments satisfy (4). In period one, physician maximizes u 2;P (c) H(cj ). The rst order condition to the investment problem gives Type 0 participates in period one if u 2;P (c 1 ) is such that exp[ r(u 2;P (c 1 ) H(c( 1 )j 1 ))] U 0;P . Types > 0 also participates because expected period one utility is increasing in . Similarly, 1 participates in period if u 2;S (s 1 ) is such that u 2;S (s 1 ) K(s( 1 )j 1 )) U 0;S and higher types also participates because period one utility is increasing in .
Claim 4: Monotonicity of investment rules.
The nal step is to check that period two matching de ned by (3) is consistent with the investment rules de ned by (4). This will be the case if c( ) and s( ), are monotonously decreasing in type. To show that this is the case, rewrite (4) as a function of . PAM in period one implies that is matched with a physician denoted 1;P ( ) such that F ( 1;P ( )) = G( ) In addition, we have 2;P (s( )) = c( 1;P ( ))
Replacing these expressions in (4) Since 1;P > 0, A2 is a su cient condition for monotonicity, c < 0 and s < 0. To conclude, note that monotonicity of the investment rules implies that there is a continuum of types (c; s) in period two and matching takes place according to (3) . QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Given that pair ( ; ) is matched together, the social planner sets the investments to maximize the period one joint surplus W 2;SB (c; s) H(cj ) K(sj ). The information constrained period one surplus of pair ( ; ) measured in certainty equivalent units is W 1 ( ; ) = M ax c;s fW 2;SB (c; s) H(cj ) K(sj )g:
The social planner selects a matching rule in period one that maximizes the joint surplus W 1 ( ; ). Since and are complement in the function W 1 ( ; ), PAM in ( ; ) is ecient. The investment rules that maximize W 2;SB (c; s) H(cj ) K(sj ) under PAM are monotonic in ( ; ) and correspond to the equilibrium investment rules. The constrained Pareto e cient allocation is identical to the equilibrium allocation. QED
